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Several high-level meetings have taken place over the last few months 
between the United States and the European Co11111unity. ~s the EC knows from 
discussions at those meetings the U.S. continues to be concerned about the 
problems created by the European Community in its implementation of the 
Conman Agricultural Poljcy. 
We recognize the policy prerogatives of the European Community to pursue 
the satisfaction of internal objectives for its agricultural sector. 
However, when the implementation of EC governmental policy in pursuit of 
those objectives becomes detrimental to the well being of U.S. fanners, it 
becomes imperative that the U.S. government act to protect the interests of 
U.S. agriculture. Such has become the case. 
The economist, Adam Smith, in the late 18th century documented the 
advantages of free and unfettered markets and the merit of a laissez-faire 
approach to those markets by governments. And David Ricardo, in the early 
19th century, argued for free trade and against the British Corn Laws, a 
trade restrictive measure not unlike the modern variable levy mechanism of 
the CAP. 
Over the last 1 1/2 decades the U.S. has made great strides in ~oving 
Government Agricultural policy away from interference with the m~rket. 
Today our domestic prices and world market prices are the same for most 
major agriculture commodities. For the most part our agricultural sector 
adjusts fully and freely to the international market. The EC, as the other 
major agricultural trader in the world today, is fully insulated from the 
international market. And that causes the U.S. severe problems. 
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TIie fo11owing evidence has been compi1ed showing how EC policy actions 
have been hannful to the agricultural producers of the U.S. and those of a 
number of other countries around the globe. We also suggest some remedial 
actions we believe necessary by the EC to show good faith in proceeding 
toward an acceptable solution to our problems. 
Our concerns about the effects of the way the CAP has been jmplemented 
center in three areas -
1. the stifling of EC internal demand for food products. 
2. EC subsidized competition with us and other exporters in third 
markets, and 
3. the added instability that the EC transmits into the world markets 
by maintaining rigidly stable internal prices and thus insulating member 
countries from the adjustments signaled by the international market. 
Internal Demand. -Several analyses are available that show the effects 
of the CAP on EC food demand. For example: 
-- A 1968 USDA study covering the grains, livestock, dairy and sugar 
products estimates the EC consumer cost of the CAP in that year to be 
$6.4 billion. 
-- A partial update of that study for 1978 shows the EC consumer cost of 
the CAP for just 4 grains (soft wheat, durum, barley, rice) and sugar to 
be $3.7 billion dollars. 
-- A recent World Bank study shows the net social loss from misalloca-
tion of resources due to CAP price distortions in wheat, corn, barley, 
sugar and beef in France, Gennany, and the UK to total as high as $1.4 
billion. The welfare transfers from consumers to producers was 
estimated as high as $6.7 billion. 
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-- Per capita consumption levels of various food products are 
enlightening. In 1978 the U.S. per capita consumption of meat was 29.5 
kilograms greater, than that in the EC; of dairy products 10 kilograms 
greater and of cereal products 19 kilograms less. Per capita beef 
consumption in the EC at 25 kilograms is 1 kilogram less than in the 
USSR. The average U.S. consumer spent 161 of income on food while the 
EC consumer spent from a low of 2~ of income on food in the Netherlands 
to a high of 451 in Ireland. 
The point is that the high agricultural prices within the EC have 
stifled consumer demand for food. We estimate that if EC agricultural 
prices were at world market levels the EC would be importing an additional 
6.5 million metric tons of feed grains, an additional 1 million tons of 
bread wheat and perhaps 1.5 million tons less of soybeans. 
Subsidized third market competition. We maintain that the EC has become 
a major world exporter of agricultural- products largely through the use of 
export subsidies provided through the CAP. 
Since its inception, the Connon Agricultural Policy has been operated to 
maintain high and stable internal prices without any mechanism to limit the 
extra production elicited by those high and'riskless price support 
measures. This excess and growing production has first displaced EC imports 
and, then as it grew larger has been disposed largely through subsidized 
prices into the international markets, thus further displacing our and other 
countries more efficient exports. 
During the period of the operation of the CAP ~he EC has moved from a 
substantial importer to a significant exporter of a large number of major 
agricultural products. EC exports as a percentage of world trade in food 
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products have increased fro1n 9. 3 percent in 1973 to 11. 4 percent in 1980. 
We stress that this increase has been achieved largely through the apolica-
tion of export subsidies. During the same period, the EC's share of world 
imports declined from 24.7 percent to 19.5 percent. Thus EC net imports of 
food products dropped from 15.4 percent in 1973 to 8.2 percent in 1980. 
These are not our numbers, they are statistics published by the GATT. 
Clearly the Co11111unfty has moved beyond self-sufficiency through its 
pricing policies. One measure of the effectiveness of the CAP levy system 
in protecting EC producers from imports is the difference in the rate of 
growth fr EC imports of levy versus non-levy products. U.S. exports of levy 
items increased in value tenns by 2.6 times between 1970 and 1979 while 
exports of non-levy items increased by 4.1 times. As a percent of total 
agricultural exports by the U.S. to the EC, variable levy items decreased 
from 31 I in 1970 to 2~ in 1 979. 
The move~ self-sufficiency on the basis of high support prices reduced 
the EC market opportunities for traditional exporters. The move beyond 
self-sufficency has spilled over into the international market through 
subsidized EC exports that compete unfairly with traditional exporters in 
third markets. 
--In grains, last year for the first time since the inception of 
the CAP the EC became a net grain exporter. The Community is now 
challenging Australia as the third largest wheat exporter with 
15.51 of total world wheat exports. This has occurred because of 
subsidies and increased levels of import protection. The import 
levies on corn and wheat during the last 15 years have risen. The 
target price for corn, for example, has been increased nearly three 
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times as fast as the intervention price during this period. This 
slowly but surely shuts out imports and contravenes both the spirit 
and intent of GATT. 
Domestic grain consumption in the EC-10 increased by nearly 9 
million metric tons from 1970/71 to 1979/80 (to 122.2 million mt), 
but the co11111unity reduced its net imports from 22.3 million mt in 
1970/71 to 2.5 million mt in 1979/80. In the 1980/81 the EC became 
a net exporter of 3.8 million mt and net exports are also 
anticipated for 1981/82. For coarse grains, net imports declined 
from 15.8 million mt in 1970/71 to 9.3 million mt in 1979/80, in 
spite of an increase in domestic consumption of 8 million 11111t 
during the same years. In 1980/81 there was a further decline in 
net imports to 6.8 million tons. 
--In sugar, EC exports have soared from 2.1 million mt in 1976/77 
to 4.5 million mt in 1980/81. This has had a tremendous impact on 
the world and the µ.s. markets and has affected sugar exports from 
Australia, Brazil, and the Philippines. The U.S. sugar industry 
estimates that EC export subsidies, which are responsible for world 
suga~market price levels, have cost U.S. industries $2.1 billion 
in lost,revenue. We would not have the type of sugar support 
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program that was passed by the U.S. Congress if it were not for the 
price depressing effects of EC sugar export subsidies. 
--In poultry, the EC ha~ moved from the worlds 1 argest importer to 
surpassing the U.S. in 1970 to become the world's largest 
exporter. The Community now accounts for 35 percent of the world 
broiler market. 
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--In beef and veal, for many years the EC was a net importer. In 
1973/74, however, the EC reached self-suffici~~=Y· Thereafter 
production continued to increase while consumption remained 
stable. This has resulted in the EC moving from a net importer 
position to the second largest exporter of beef in the world for 
the last two years, behind only Australia. 
--In fruit, the EC processing subsidies pose a serious threat to 
U.S. producers. The recently introduced subsidies for Greek raisin 
producers have virtually stopped U.S. raisin exports to the EC. 
This policy which also applies to canned fruits impairs bindings 
given in good faith by the Conmunity during GATT negotiations. 
Transmission of instability. EC policies also contribute to increased 
world market instability. By maintaining a rigid internal price structure 
under the CAP and insulating the EC agricultural sector from the interna-
tional market, the EC'forces other countries to bear the brunt of interna-
tional market instability. Although some of the less developed countries 
are least able to cope with these distortions, the U.S. also must adjust 
both production and consumption to acconmodate EC market distorting 
practices. As one indicat~r of increased market instability, USDA analysts 
estimate that present U.S. export volume projections are subject to a 
forecast error of! 12 percent or 16 million metric tons, up substantially 
from a forecast error of! 8 percent or 5.5 million metric tons in 1950. 
While the EC is not accountable for all of this growing instaoility, as 
a major agricultural trader it must accept responsibility for its fair 
share. And we fully expect the E.C. to share the burden with the U.S. 
\ 
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fhus as we step back and look at the CAP as it has developed over the 
last 20 years, we see a policy that has results~ in high and rigid internal 
support prices that have increased production and slowed consumption to such 
an extent that the Community is now a major exporter of most major food 
products. This was achieved because product surpluses to the domestic 
market were pushed into export through the aid of export subsidies, further 
exacerbating the instability of world markets. 
The cost for these policies has soared enonnously, to the point where 
the EC budget for direct market support in 1982 is projected to exceed $14 
billion with about 50 percent of those expenditures going to export 
subsidies. In addition, some $20 billion will be spent by the Member States 
on agricultural support programs. 
Quite frankly we feel that this approach has gotten out of hand. The 
sharp increase in EC exports is imposing a serious burden on U.S. fanners 
who have become increasingly dependent-during.the past 20 years on export 
m~rkets. Today nearly 40 percent of U.S. cropland is devoted to export 
production. Unfair competition by foreign competitors in the fonn of export 
subsidies threaten our export markets and the livelihood of U.S. producers. 
An unfolding political difficulty for this Administration is the 40 percent 
decline in net U.S. fann income in 1981 that in real tenns constitutes the 
lowest level of net fann incoine since the Depression. Because of low grain 
prices, we expect have to make deficiency payments to farmers totaling more 
than $500 million in FY 1982. Further, we are now projecting the value of 
our exports this year will fall below last years level. This will be the 
first downturn in exports since 1969. 
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In this enviromnent USDA has had to abandon its position against 
production controls and announce set asi~e programs. If we achieve producer 
participation in the wheat set aside program for the 1982/83 crop year of 
about 10 percent, it will result fn a decrease in U.S. wheat production of 
about 7.5 million mt. That is nearly the amount by which the EC has 
increased its wheat exports to world markets over the past three seasons. 
USDA analysts have estimated the effects on the U.S. and other suppliers 
if in 1981 the EC would have exported only 7 million metric tons of wheat (a 
more historical level) rather than the 14.5 million metric tons that were 
shipped. The U.S. would have exported 4.1 million tons more, Canada l 
million tons more, Australia 200 thousand tons more and Argentina 100 
thousand tons more. 
The U.S. producer price for wheat (and thus the world price) would have 
been 50 cents per bushel higher resulting in an increase in net fann income 
for U.S. producers of 1.7 billion dollars. 
Even if the EC would have substituted 6 of the 7 million tons of EC 
wheat for imported corn, the price of corn would have decrea~ed only 13 
cents per bushel and the net fann income gain to U.S. producers would still 
have been 800 million dollars. 
The point is that EC subsidized exports are hurting the U.S. High 
internal EC prices stifle food demand by consumers, some of which would be 
satisfied by imports. Subsidized exports add supplies into the world 
market. Both of these actions depress world market prices and thus our 
domestic producer prices. This results in higher fann program costs for 
both the EC and the U.S. EC consumers bear the burden. U.S. producers bear 
the burden. And taxpayers on both sides of the Atlantic bear the burden. 
•. 
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If we cannot resolve our differences, we are on a collision course. 
Last November when EC official~ were here they spoke of refonn of the CAP. 
The U.S. applauds the internal EC discussions now underway ·on the need for 
CAP refonn. The proposal to phase EC prices to world market levels is most 
welcome. But we must ask how this convergence will take place when the 
Co11111ission is proposing an average increase in prices for 1982/83 of about 
6.6 percent. And again target prices would be increased more (71) than 
intervention prices, increasing further the levels of EC protection for 
grains. 
The U.S. cannot tolerate the evolution of the CAP to a Common Export 
Policy as the proposals imply. The proposals are silent on the subject of 
export subsidies. As we have indicated, EC export subsidies are the single 
most hannful of EC policies. The U.S. must see an acceptable plan and 
timetable for their elimination. 
The proposals indicate a target volume of grain production of 130 
million mt excluding durum by 1988. To achieve that target would take an 
annual rate of production increase of 1.71, significantly lower than the EC 
historical rate of yield increase. The proposed reduction of 11 in the 
intervention price in the following year for each million tons of production 
over the target volume seems to be a rather mild price penalty. Is the EC 
pre~1red to impose production controls ff necessary? And what level of 
export do the volume targets imply? 
While the EC proposes phasing internal prices to world levels by 1988. 
Nothing is said about the level of threshold prices at that point. To share 
in the international market instability, it is important that EC border 
• 
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protection be keyed to world price movements in such a way that EC 
production and consumption will adjust on the basis of world market 
conditions. Such adjustment would also require increased stocking levels in 
the EC. 
To su11111arize, we do not question the European Community's right to 
export agricultural products. Our concern is that net exports from the 
Co11111unity not be allowed to rise as long as world prices are below EC 
prices. Until this principle is allowed to prevail, we must regard EC trade 
policies as a major problem that will continue to erode the overall 
relations between our countries. 
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